Qatar borrows from China and buys from America. Can it win back Asia’s gas buyers?

- More than eight months of force majeure have cost QatarEnergy its first long-term customer: Poland’s Orlen gave notice on 10 November that it was ending a 1 million tonne-a-year, oil-linked contract, a move analysts say could save it up to $2 billion.
- China is hedging on both sides: four Chinese state banks reportedly lent QatarEnergy $3 billion in October and Sinopec and CNPC hold stakes in its expansion, while China Gas raised its long-term US LNG offtake from Venture Global to 3 million tonnes a year on 17 November.
- Doha is turning itself into a global gas trader, buying US LNG to hedge against future Hormuz disruptions, but whether Asia’s buyers return will depend on how fast the strait reopens and whether oil-linked Qatari contracts still look competitive.
Why it matters now
On 17 November Venture Global announced that China Gas Holdings, a Hong Kong-listed gas operator, had doubled the 20-year agreement it signed in September to 1 million tonnes a year (Mt/y) of US liquefied natural gas (LNG), with deliveries from 2030. A week earlier, on 10 November, Poland’s Orlen said in a regulatory filing that it was terminating one of its two long-term contracts with QatarEnergy “due to an ongoing force majeure resulting in an inability to meet contractual delivery obligations”. Reuters described it as the first known termination of a long-term QatarEnergy LNG contract since the Iran war disrupted exports.
Together the two announcements frame the question facing Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG exporter: when the Strait of Hormuz reopens, will Asia’s buyers come back, and on what terms? On 19 November Xi Jinping hosts Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen for what Beijing calls a “China-Russia-US heads of state meeting”, and the US-China trade truce agreed in Busan last year runs out in January, NPR reported. Neither Venture Global nor China Gas linked their deal to the summit.
Background
Qatar shipped a record 81.5 million tonnes of LNG in 2025, 18.7% of world trade and second only to the United States, according to International Gas Union data reported by The Peninsula. All of it leaves through Hormuz. After the US and Israeli war with Iran began on 28 February, QatarEnergy declared force majeure to affected buyers on 4 March, and Iranian missile strikes later that month damaged two of the 14 liquefaction trains at Ras Laffan, removing 12.8 Mt/y, about 17% of export capacity. Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, QatarEnergy’s chief executive and Qatar’s minister of state for energy affairs, said on 29 October that repairs would take about three years and that output would be limited to about 83% of pre-war levels until then, Reuters reported. The force majeure has been extended to the end of 2026; in March QatarEnergy put the cost at about $20 billion a year in lost revenue.
Exports have recovered only partly. Qatar shipped 2.09 million tonnes through Hormuz in October, up from nothing in April but a third of the 6.09 million tonnes a month it averaged in the three months before 28 February, according to Reuters columnist Clyde Russell. Spot LNG for north Asia cost $31.30 per million British thermal units (mmBtu) in the week to 13 November, against $10.40 in the week before the strikes on Iran. In April the International Energy Agency (IEA) said the damage in Qatar would delay the expected wave of new global LNG supply by at least two years and could cost a cumulative 120 billion cubic metres (bcm) of supply through 2030, CBS News reported. In November it put the year-on-year fall in LNG loadings from Qatar and the UAE between March and October at 60 bcm, ANI reported.
Asia has learnt to live without Qatari cargoes
Orlen’s arithmetic shows why the force majeure is more than a delay. The cancelled contract, signed in 2009 and due to run until 2034, is priced against crude: market participants estimate about 16% of Brent, which with Brent at about $96 a barrel means roughly $15 per mmBtu, against $6 to $7 under many long-term US deals, Reuters reported. Martin Senior, head of LNG pricing at Argus, put the potential saving at about $1.95 billion, or $1.58 billion after shipping costs. An Orlen spokesperson said current market conditions “offer alternative gas procurement options that are more favourable”, and Venture Global began commercial deliveries earlier in November from the first phase of its Plaquemines plant in Louisiana, where Orlen is a long-term customer. Prolonged force majeure typically gives buyers the right to walk away, The National noted. Aly Blakeway, head of Atlantic LNG at S&P Global Energy, said the prolonged force majeure “could provide buyers with an opportunity to reassess” the economics of existing Brent-linked contracts in the Middle East, Reuters reported.
No other buyer has publicly followed Orlen, but Asia’s importers have spent eight months finding substitutes. Chinese buyers hold 27 Mt/y of contracted Qatari supply, the most of any country, against 13.1 Mt/y for India and 9.8 Mt/y for Taiwan, according to the Cedigaz LNG contracts database. Yet China took only 4.7 million tonnes from Qatar between January and July, 57.6% less than a year earlier, cutting Qatar’s share of its LNG imports to 13.3%, according to Bancosta data reported by Global LNG Hub. Australia supplied 35.6% of China’s LNG over the period, and deliveries from Russia rose by 31.3%. Cedigaz found that China also leaned on Russian pipeline gas, storage and fuel substitution; that South Korea lifted caps on coal-fired generation; and that Indian gas companies cut deliveries to industry as more cargoes came from Oman, the United States, Nigeria and Angola. Japan, where Qatari LNG made up only 4–6% of imports, had less to replace.
Price is doing the rest. The high spot price “is discouraging imports by China, the world’s largest LNG importer”, Russell wrote, and China’s purchases are likely to fall in 2026 to their lowest since 2018. The uncomfortable lesson for Doha is that its customers have shown they can buy less, and buy elsewhere, and will carry that knowledge into every contract renewal.
Beijing’s two-track bet
Chinese state capital, meanwhile, is tying itself more closely to Qatar’s recovery. In October Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction Bank (Asia) lent QatarEnergy $3 billion for five years, for general working capital, Bloomberg reported, citing people familiar with the matter. Sinopec holds minority stakes in North Field East and North Field South with 27-year contracts for a combined 7 Mt/y, and CNPC holds a stake in North Field East with a 27-year contract for 4 Mt/y, EnterpriseAM noted. Al Majalla reports that 24 QC-Max carriers on QatarEnergy’s order book, worth about $8 billion together, are being built in China. It also notes that there is no public evidence that Qatar pledged gas reserves as collateral or gave the banks rights over gas pricing.
The loan fits a wider pattern. Chinese banks’ lending to the Gulf, excluding bilateral loans, rose more than fivefold to a record $11.5 billion in 2025, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Four Chinese state lenders supplied about $3.7 billion of the financing tied to Aramco’s Jafurah midstream deal, and Chinese banks were among the lenders to ADNOC’s Hail and Ghasha offshore gas project, EnterpriseAM noted. “Asia has become the first call,” Natixis chief economist Alicia García-Herrero told the outlet, describing Chinese lenders as “a genuine major alternative, not just an add-on”.
Chinese buyers, however, are hedging in the other direction. China imported only 0.1 million tonnes of US LNG between January and July, 0.2% of its total, according to the Bancosta figures; Enerdata notes that China suspended imports of US LNG in March 2025, after Beijing’s tariffs on US energy products took effect in mid-February. Yet China Gas now has 3 Mt/y of US supply under 20-year contracts with Venture Global. Its chairman, Liu Ming Hui, said the contracted volumes would “enhance our sourcing flexibility and support the continued growth of our LNG trading business”. That is the language of a portfolio buyer spreading risk across oceans, not of a customer waiting for one supplier to recover.
Beijing gains either way. If Qatar recovers, Chinese companies hold equity and long-term contracts in its expansion, and Chinese banks are among its creditors. If Hormuz stays dangerous, Chinese buyers have contracted American volumes that never pass through it. What China has not done is choose between them.
Qatar’s answer: from producer to portfolio player
Doha’s response borrows from the playbook of the international majors. QatarEnergy has signed a 20-year agreement to buy 3 Mt/y from Woodside’s US facilities and two agreements with Cheniere Energy for up to 4 Mt/y through 2054, with Cheniere deliveries not expected before 2031, Reuters reported on 29 October. Mr al-Kaabi said the target was “much higher”, that talks were under way with “everybody”, including Venture Global, and that “there’s more to come”. The strategy is designed to earn revenue if Hormuz exports are disrupted again, drawing on QatarEnergy’s trading arm and a fleet of about 200 LNG tankers. “You can imagine the arbitrage you can make, and that would make up some of the loss,” he said. QatarEnergy already owns 70% of the Golden Pass export project in Texas, Al Majalla notes.
There are limits. Mr al-Kaabi said Qatar’s long-term contracts are point-to-point, so US volumes cannot simply be offered to long-term customers as a Hormuz backup. The core proposition Qatar has sold to Asian buyers, large and dependable volumes on long-term contracts, still rests on the strait. The expansion meant to entrench it is under way: North Field East’s four trains, of about 8 Mt/y each, are designed to lift capacity from 77 Mt/y to 110 Mt/y, on the way to a 142 Mt/y target that Mr al-Kaabi says is unchanged. Reuters reported in October that the first unit would be ready to start up in November, with LNG production expected in the first quarter of 2027, and on 29 October that production would require a US-Iran peace deal. The commercial risk is that the new capacity arrives in a market that has learnt to manage without it, and in which Chinese buyers have become more price-sensitive.
What to watch
- Force majeure after 31 December. The current notice runs to the end of 2026. Another extension into 2027 would test buyers whose contracts, like Orlen’s, allow them to walk away after prolonged force majeure.
- Hormuz loadings. Qatar’s monthly exports, 2.09 million tonnes in October against 6.09 million before the war, are the clearest gauge of recovery. The IEA’s winter scenarios range from a 3% year-on-year fall in global LNG supply if the strait reopens progressively from January to a 7% fall if it stays closed until the end of March.
- Shenzhen and the truce. Whether this week’s meetings in Shenzhen, or a renewal of the Busan truce before it expires in January, reopen China to US LNG well before Venture Global’s 2030 start date.
- North Field East. Whether the first train produces in the first quarter of 2027, and whether Sinopec, CNPC and other Asian buyers keep or expand their offtake as Qatar’s capacity climbs towards 142 Mt/y.
Bottom line
Qatar has not lost Asia, but it is losing the assumption that Asia will wait for it. Chinese banks are helping QatarEnergy through the crisis and Chinese companies have a stake in its expansion, yet Chinese buyers, like Orlen in Europe, are signing contracts for American gas that never passes through Hormuz. Doha’s turn to trading US LNG is a sensible hedge, but it makes QatarEnergy look more like its rivals just as its distinctive selling point, dependable volume, has been dented. The decisive variable is still the strait: a durable reopening in early 2027 would let North Field East start up into a tight market, while a longer closure would give more buyers both the reason and the contractual room to follow Orlen.
Sources
- Venture Global (Business Wire, via FinancialContent), “Venture Global and China Gas Announce Increased Long-Term LNG Agreement”, 17 November 2026.
- Enerdata, “China Gas signs new 0.5 Mt/year LNG deal with Venture Global (US)”, 16 September 2026.
- The National (Jennifer Gnana), “Poland’s Orlen becomes first buyer to cancel QatarEnergy LNG contract”, 11 November 2026.
- Reuters (via Baird Maritime), “Poland’s Orlen terminates QatarEnergy LNG deal in war fallout”, 11 November 2026.
- Reuters (via Baird Maritime), “Poland’s Orlen stands to save up to $2b from QatarEnergy LNG deal cancellation”, 13 November 2026.
- Reuters (via BOE Report), “QatarEnergy buys US, other LNG to hedge future Hormuz disruptions”, 29 October 2026.
- Reuters (Clyde Russell column, via BOE Report), “Europe draws LNG from Asia, but not fast enough: Russell”, 15 November 2026.
- The Peninsula (Deepak John), “Qatar strengthens LNG leadership as exports reach record high in 2025”, 30 July 2026.
- CBS News (Megan Cerullo), “IEA says Iran war will keep the global natural gas market tight for two years”, 24 April 2026.
- ANI (via Qatar Tribune), “Global gas supplies could tighten in winter amid Hormuz supply shock: IEA”, 8 November 2026.
- Cedigaz (Irina Mironova), “How do importers of Qatari LNG solve the supply issue?”, 27 May 2026.
- Global LNG Hub (David Callanan, citing Bancosta), “China LNG imports fall as supply mix shifts”, 2 September 2026.
- Bloomberg (via Energy Connects), “QatarEnergy Secures $3 Billion Loan From Four Chinese Banks”, 7 October 2026.
- Euronews (Mohamed Elashi), “QatarEnergy’s LNG expansion targets early 2027 production amid reports of $3bn loan”, 9 October 2026.
- EnterpriseAM, “Chinese banks are lending to Gulf energy giants, and analysts say the borrowers are choosing it”, 3 November 2026.
- Al Majalla (Abdel-Rahman Ayas), “Can China’s $3bn loan to QatarEnergy revive LNG exports?”, November 2026.
- ANI (via Times of Oman), “China confirms first Xi-Trump-Putin summit on November 19”, 16 November 2026.
- NPR (Deepa Shivaram, via WUNC), “Trump heads to Asia to meet with Xi and Putin amid Nvidia fallout”, 16 November 2026.
Photo: LNG carriers at the Ras Laffan LNG terminal, Qatar, in 2012 — Matthew Smith, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
china Energy security LNG Qatar Strait of Hormuz