The West is shutting out Chinese grid hardware. Why is the Gulf plugging it in?

- The Gulf is now a front-line market for Chinese grid batteries: in June Saudi Arabia switched on more storage, in gigawatt-hours, than China did, and the Middle East accounted for almost 29% of the Chinese storage-system contracts tallied for the third quarter, second only to Europe.
- Gulf buyers are heading the opposite way to Europe and the United States, which in 2026 moved on security grounds to restrict Chinese inverters and battery systems in publicly funded and bulk-power projects.
- Beijing will sell the hardware but is tightening its grip on the know-how: a Chinese cell maker has just abandoned an Oman factory partly over China’s proposed curbs on solar-technology exports, a warning for Gulf plans to make, not merely buy, such equipment.
Why it matters now
Three developments in four days have set out the terms of the Gulf’s new energy bargain with China. On 12 November the board of Hainan Drinda New Energy Technology, a Chinese solar-cell maker, decided to scrap a planned 5 GW TOPCon cell plant in Oman’s Sohar Free Zone, conceived as part of a 10 GW project; PV Tech puts the investment at about $280 million. Among its reasons, the company listed Beijing’s proposal to put certain photovoltaic technologies and key production equipment under export control.
On 13 November the Oman Investment Authority (OIA) publicised what it called its largest-ever package of agreements with Chinese partners, signed on 2 November during Sultan Haitham bin Tarik’s state visit to China. It includes a framework agreement under which OIA’s subsidiary Nama Holding and State Grid International Development are to develop 1 GW of battery storage, which OIA valued at about RO384.5 million ($1 billion), according to MEED. And 15 November was the deadline for public comment on China’s plan to add 12 solar-manufacturing technologies to its export-control list.
Together they show a region buying Chinese grid hardware at record pace while finding the technology to make it at home harder to obtain, just as the West moves the other way. Ahead of COP31 in Antalya, China’s vice-minister of ecology and environment, Li Gao, said the talks should take up “the new problem of unilateralism and protectionism undermining global collective efforts”. Washington’s rules on foreign grid equipment are due by 24 December.
Background
Chinese equipment has underpinned the Gulf’s solar build-out for years: according to the Carboun Institute, more than 98% of the solar modules imported by the UAE in 2022 and 2023 came from China. At the start of 2026, announced battery projects in operation, under construction or in procurement totalled 37 GWh in Saudi Arabia and about 28 GWh in the UAE, according to Energy-Storage.News.
In June Saudi Arabia commissioned 2.5 GW/12.5 GWh of storage, 37.3% of the 33.5 GWh brought online worldwide that month, according to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence data; China added about 10.1 GWh. It was the first month in 18 months of Energy-Storage.News coverage that a region other than China led; all the Saudi capacity came from five Saudi Electricity Company projects using BYD batteries.
Chinese order books agree. Of about 74 GWh of storage-system contracts signed by Chinese companies in the third quarter, the Middle East accounted for about 21.3 GWh, or 28.7%, second only to Europe, according to an incomplete tally by EnergyTrend, a TrendForce unit.
Solar panels follow a lumpier pattern. In March, when China’s solar exports hit a record 68 GW, Ember found the Middle East was “the only region not to see a step up in solar imports, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects trade flows”. By September the picture had flipped: Shanghai Metals Market (SMM) estimates that China’s module exports to Saudi Arabia rose from 0.74 GW in August to 2.90 GW, the largest increase among the destinations it tracks. InfoLink Consulting, which puts Saudi Arabia’s share at about 2.45 GW, attributes the surge largely to the release of shipments delayed by earlier shipping disruption and cautions against treating it as a new baseline.
A grid built in China, financed in the Gulf
In Abu Dhabi, Masdar and the state offtaker EWEC are building the “round-the-clock” (RTC) project: 5.2 GW of solar and 19 GWh of batteries, designed to deliver 1 GW of baseload power around the clock. It reached financial close in July with a $5.1 billion financing package from 13 banks, including Bank of China, within a total investment of $6.1 billion, and is expected to operate in 2027. Its supply chain is overwhelmingly Chinese. JinkoSolar and JA Solar are each providing 2.6 GW of modules, and PowerChina shares the engineering, procurement and construction work with India’s Larsen & Toubro. Reports differ on who supplies the batteries, but all the names are Chinese: Sungrow (7.5 GWh, plus 2.6 GW of inverters), BYD (11.275 GWh) and, according to MEED, CATL.
Saudi Arabia is buying storage through state tenders. In August the Saudi Power Procurement Company (SPPC) signed 15-year agreements for its first build-own-operate battery round: four 500 MW, four-hour projects totalling 2 GW/8 GWh, worth more than SAR4.35 billion (about $1.16 billion). Three went to a consortium including ACWA Power, and in September China’s Gotion High-Tech said it had secured contracts covering 6 GWh of battery storage for them. A second round, 3 GW/12 GWh across six projects, has 27 pre-qualified bidders, including China Southern Power Grid, PowerChina and SPIC alongside Tesla, KEPCO, EDF and TotalEnergies.
In Oman, the Nama–State Grid framework covers two 500 MW systems, at the Duqm Industrial Station and the Al-Subaikhi (Ibri Solar 3) station. State Grid already owns 49% of Oman Electricity Transmission Company, under a deal agreed in 2019. The same package includes a $100 million preliminary term sheet with PCG Power and Hoymiles covering solar projects and a solar-inverter factory intended to serve Middle East and North African markets.
Chinese suppliers offer the volume, speed and financing that multi-gigawatt projects need, but price alone does not explain the choice: the European Commission estimates that switching to inverters from suppliers not deemed “high-risk” adds less than 2% to total project costs. Gulf purchasing implies a judgement that the security risk is manageable, one that Europe and the United States have now rejected.
The West writes Chinese kit out of its grids
On 4 May the European Commission said it would phase out inverters from “high-risk” suppliers in all EU-funded energy projects, including those financed by the European Investment Bank. Euronews cited Huawei and Sungrow as examples of the Chinese manufacturers concerned. “We have identified serious economic and cybersecurity risks,” an EU official told reporters on condition of anonymity. Advanced projects faced review by 1 November, a deadline the Commission declined in September to extend. From April 2027 new contracts must fully incorporate the restrictions, subject to limited derogations. The guidance covers solar, wind and storage, and is driven particularly by the risk that manufacturers could remotely access and manipulate inverters. Chinese manufacturers hold an estimated 80% share of the global inverter market.
Washington has gone further. Executive Order 14420, signed on 26 August under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, declares a national emergency over the threat that foreign-produced equipment poses to the bulk-power system. It authorises the energy secretary to prohibit certain acquisitions, imports, transfers or installations of such equipment, explicitly including grid-connected inverters and battery energy storage systems, where a “Covered Foreign Entity” is involved, and to impose conditions on equipment already in service, including requirements to replace or remove it. Lawyers at Akin Gump say that term, which covers governments under US arms embargoes, is likely to include China, Russia and Iran, among others. Implementing rules are due within 120 days, by 24 December.
Gulf grids, meanwhile, are absorbing the very suppliers Brussels has in mind, Sungrow at Abu Dhabi’s RTC project among them. The Carboun Institute warned in February that Saudi Arabia and the UAE rely on Chinese inverters, often managed remotely via platforms hosted in China, and that in a worst case a remote shutdown could “disable thousands of inverters simultaneously”. It notes that China is now the Gulf’s primary supplier of renewable technology, while the United States remains the region’s main security guarantor.
Beijing sells the hardware but guards the blueprints
The Gulf’s stated aim is to make clean-energy equipment, not just install it. In July 2024 Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), through its Renewable Energy Localization Company, signed three joint ventures with Chinese firms and the Saudi group Vision Industries: with JinkoSolar for 10 GW a year of cells and modules, with TCL Zhonghuan’s subsidiary Lumetech for 20 GW of ingots and wafers, and with Envision for 4 GW of wind-turbine components. PIF’s stated goal is to localise 75% of the components in Saudi renewable projects by 2030. “These projects will also enable Saudi Arabia to become a global hub for export of renewable technologies,” said Yazeed Al-Humied, PIF’s deputy governor.
China’s October proposal goes to the heart of such plans. The Ministry of Commerce proposed banning exports of technologies for some thin wafers, perovskite and tandem cells and large-scale fluidised-bed polysilicon, and restricting, but not prohibiting, exports of advanced cell technologies including TOPCon, HJT and XBC. Until the catalogue is updated, exporters must register certain technology transfers abroad. The ministry said the restrictions aim to “guard against the risks of technologies from running out of control or being improperly disseminated”. TOPCon is what Drinda planned to make in Sohar and, according to PV Tech, JinkoSolar’s main product, though the Saudi deal specified no cell technology; wafers are the TCL venture’s business.
Drinda’s retreat should not be over-read. It also cited shifting trade and tariff policies, regional uncertainty since the conflict that began at the end of February, and the slow development of Oman’s local solar supply chain. It had started no substantive construction and reported a third-quarter net loss of RMB175.26 million. Even so, it is a concrete sign that Beijing’s controls are entering Gulf investment decisions. In February the Carboun Institute judged that, should great-power competition intensify, China would be “less likely to resort to broad export restrictions given its current economic constraints”. The distinction now looks clearer: Beijing remains keen to export finished panels, batteries and inverters, but treats the processes behind them as strategic assets. That leaves Gulf localisation at risk of becoming assembly under licence; Carboun warned that it may “strengthen the Gulf’s renewable ambitions while simultaneously replicating structural dependence”.
What to watch
- China’s final list. Whether TOPCon, HJT and XBC remain restricted rather than prohibited in the final catalogue, and how Beijing treats technology transfers to Chinese joint ventures abroad, including the planned Saudi plants.
- Washington’s rules, due by 24 December. How the Department of Energy applies the “Covered Foreign Entity” test to Chinese inverter and battery makers; a strict reading would widen the gap between the American and Gulf markets for the same suppliers.
- Saudi Arabia’s second battery round. Whether bidders such as Tesla, KEPCO and EDF, and their equipment choices, dent the dominance of Chinese batteries in the 3 GW/12 GWh tender.
- Delivery in 2027. Abu Dhabi’s RTC project is due to operate in 2027, when the EU’s restrictions apply in full to new contracts; whether Oman’s Duqm and Ibri systems move from framework to binding contract will test the latest commitments.
Bottom line
The Gulf has bet that Chinese batteries, panels and inverters are the fastest and cheapest route to a solar-powered grid, just as Europe and the United States have concluded that the same equipment is a security risk. The bet is delivering capacity at record speed, but the past week exposed its limit. Beijing is willing to supply the hardware and help finance it, yet increasingly reluctant to hand over the technology to build it. Unless Gulf states diversify suppliers or secure genuine technology transfer, their energy transition risks swapping exposure to oil markets and shipping lanes for dependence on a single country for the machines that keep their grids running.
Sources
- PV Tech, “China’s Drinda scraps plan for 5GW TOPCon solar cell plant in Oman”, 13 November 2026.
- TaiyangNews, “China’s Drinda Cancels Planned 5 GW Solar Cell Factory In Oman”, 13 November 2026.
- Oman Investment Authority via PR Newswire (The Manila Times), “Oman Investment Authority signs largest-ever investment package with Chinese partners during historic state visit”, 13 November 2026.
- Arabian Business, “Oman opens the door to billions in Chinese capital as Gulf investment map shifts”, 15 November 2026.
- MEED, “Oman signs 1GW battery storage agreement”, 3 November 2026.
- MEES, “Oman-China Sign 1GW Battery Deal”, 6 November 2026.
- SaudiGulf Projects, “Nama Holding and State Grid Sign Framework Agreement for 1 GW Battery Storage in Duqm and Ibri”, 2 November 2026.
- Reuters via AsiaOne, “China proposes export controls on solar-manufacturing technologies”, 18 October 2026.
- Reuters via The Standard, “China signals intent to push back against cleantech tariffs at COP31”, 21 October 2026.
- Carboun Institute (Yunis Sharifli), “Balancing the Grid and Geopolitics: The Gulf’s Renewable Energy Cooperation with China”, 10 February 2026.
- Energy-Storage.News, “Global BESS deployments soar 27% in H1 2026, Saudi Arabia drives figures in June”, 15 July 2026.
- Energy-Storage.News, “Saudi Power Procurement Company awards 2GW/8GWh of battery storage contracts”, August 2026.
- EnergyTrend (TrendForce), “94 GWh! Chinese Firms Account for Over 90% of Overseas Energy Storage Orders in Q3 2026”, 8 October 2026.
- Ember, “Chinese solar exports double in a month to hit record high amid energy crisis”, 23 April 2026.
- Shanghai Metals Market (SMM), “China’s PV Module Exports, Sep 2026: Up 44% MoM as Middle East Surges and Southeast Asian Demand Improves”, 21 October 2026.
- TaiyangNews (InfoLink data), “China’s Solar Module Exports Rebound 45% In September 2026”, 31 October 2026.
- MEED, “Masdar reaches financial close on world-first 24/7 solar project”, 14 July 2026.
- Electrek, “BYD wins 11.3 GWh battery deal for world’s largest solar+storage”, 10 July 2026.
- RenewEconomy, “China giant joins list of suppliers to massive ’round-the-clock’ solar and battery project”, 25 May 2026.
- Zawya, “China’s Gotion High-Tech wins 6GWh battery storage contracts in Saudi Arabia”, 28 September 2026.
- Enerdata, “Saudi Arabia shortlists 27 bidders for its 3 GW/12 GWh BESS tender”, 8 July 2026.
- Euronews, “EU moves to ban high-risk inverters from China over cybersecurity threats”, 4 May 2026.
- Euronews, “EU Commission rejects calls to delay phase-out of Chinese power inverters”, 23 September 2026.
- Baker McKenzie, “US Government Issues Executive Order 14420 to Secure US Bulk-Power System”, 1 September 2026.
- KPMG, “United States declares national emergency regarding bulk-power system”, 27 August 2026.
- Akin Gump, “Return of the Bulk-Power Executive Order: Upcoming Restrictions on Foreign-Produced Bulk-Power System Electric Equipment Transactions”, client alert, 2026.
- Public Investment Fund, “PIF strengthens renewable energy localization in Saudi Arabia with three new joint ventures”, 16 July 2024.
- PV Tech, “Saudi Arabia signs deals for 30GW domestic solar PV manufacturing”, 17 July 2024.
Battery storage china Export controls Oman Saudi Arabia