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China 19 Nov 2026 · 09:54 · 11 min read by Silk Road

Washington shuts China’s cloud loophole. Is the Gulf now the safe harbour for AI chips?

Abu Dhabi at night seen from the International Space Station
Abu Dhabi at night, seen from the International Space Station on 22 May 2025 — NASA Johnson Space Center, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
Key takeaways

  • A US rule in force from 19 November requires a licence for American AI chips used by any data centre in the world, the Gulf included, that rents large amounts of computing power to companies whose parent is in China or another embargoed country.
  • Washington named Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil, not the Gulf, as diversion risks and preserved the UAE’s licence-free channel for approved entities, which makes Emirati campuses look like the compliant alternative.
  • The price of that trust is the Gulf’s China hedge: the UAE and Qatar signed the US-led Pax Silica declaration on 15 November, Saudi Arabia did not, and Beijing has promised “necessary measures”.

Why it matters now

On 16 November the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released an interim final rule, “Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors”. It takes effect on 19 November, with public comments accepted until 19 January 2027, according to the trade law firm Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg. The timing is pointed: 19 November is the day Donald Trump meets Xi Jinping in Shenzhen.

The rule closes what Washington calls the cloud loophole. US export controls generally bar Chinese firms from buying Nvidia’s most advanced chips directly, but some have rented the same computing power from data centres in Southeast Asia instead, Nextgov/FCW reported. The Institute for Progress, a Washington think tank, estimates that remote access will account for 23 per cent of China’s access to AI chips by the end of this year (cited by the Center for a New American Security, CNAS) and for nearly a third of its advanced compute by the end of 2027 (cited by The Next Web).

The trigger was a scandal. Jensen Huang resigned as Nvidia’s chief executive on 12 November, and the Commerce and Justice departments have confirmed a criminal investigation into Megaspeed, a Singapore-based cloud company that US authorities suspect of helping move Nvidia’s most powerful chips to China, AFP reported. Megaspeed has denied wrongdoing. BIS says the rule was “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council”.

For the Gulf, the week brought two signals at once. A day before the rule, the UAE and Qatar signed the US-led Pax Silica “San Francisco Declaration” on protecting the technologies and infrastructure behind AI. Saudi Arabia was not among the signatories. On 17 November China’s Foreign Ministry said Beijing would take “necessary measures”.

Background

The Gulf came into this rule already sorted. In July Washington published a separate rule on “Enhanced Favorable Treatment for the United Arab Emirates” that moved the UAE into Country Group A:5 and cleared G42 and its subsidiary Core42 to buy advanced US chips without a licence until 6 April 2027, unless BIS decides otherwise, EnterpriseAM reported. It also gave licence-free status for UAE builds to eight US companies, including Microsoft, OpenAI, Oracle, Amazon and xAI. BIS keeps an export control officer in the UAE.

Saudi Arabia sits on a different footing. It holds a licence that can be revoked for a specific product or user, rather than the standing status the UAE enjoys under US export rules, EnterpriseAM noted. In November 2025 Washington authorised the export of up to 35,000 Nvidia Blackwell GB300 chips each to G42 and to Humain, the kingdom’s PIF-backed AI champion, Fortune reported; last month Humain announced plans with Nvidia to deploy around 27,000 GPUs and up to 84 MW of computing capacity. In Abu Dhabi, G42 is developing Stargate UAE, a 1-GW computing cluster, with US partners including Nvidia.

The diplomacy has run in parallel. Pax Silica, a US-led initiative launched in December 2025 to strengthen supply chains for semiconductors, critical minerals, energy and advanced manufacturing (Al-Monitor), signed up Qatar on 12 January and the UAE days later (The New Arab). At its second summit, in Washington in late June, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain signed a further joint statement; Saudi Arabia signed neither text, EnterpriseAM reported. Oman, meanwhile, is among the 29 founding members of the China-led World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO), according to Arab Gulf Business Insight (AGBI).

What the rule does, and where it bites in the Gulf

The core of the rule is a new end-use control. A licence is needed to export, re-export or transfer advanced chips when the supplier knows they are destined for a data centre “anywhere in the world” that provides more than 12 million units of “total processing performance” to, or for, companies headquartered in China, Macau or another Country Group D:5 state, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered there, the law firms Gibson Dunn and Nixon Peabody explain. That is roughly 760 of Nvidia’s H100 chips by one CNAS estimate, or around 200 of one chipmaker’s most advanced GPUs, according to Gibson Dunn. Digitally linked facilities count together, so the threshold cannot be dodged by spreading a customer across sites, and access “for” a covered company includes a client outside the D:5 group that trains or supplies models to one.

Data centres already serving such customers must obtain a licence, not merely apply for one, within 90 days, and applications are reviewed case by case. To show they lack “knowledge”, exporters are expected to obtain information on the data centre’s own customer checks, including ownership by persons in China or other D:5 countries; a refusal to provide it is a red flag that “presumptively” gives the exporter knowledge unless resolved, Nixon Peabody and Pillsbury note.

Two features matter for the Gulf. First, D:5 is not only China. It is a list of 22 embargoed states that, according to Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, includes Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Sudan, so a Gulf campus renting large amounts of compute to a company headquartered in Baghdad or Beirut falls under the same requirement. Second, the rule keeps the UAE in a category of its own: shipments there need a licence “except where the ultimate consignee and all end users are approved UAE entities”, according to the rule text quoted by Gibson Dunn.

Sam Winter-Levy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told Fortune that the rule “primarily affects Gulf companies” renting large amounts of compute to Chinese-parented firms and “otherwise does not fundamentally change the situation for the UAE”.

Southeast Asia’s loss, the Gulf’s opening?

The rule’s second part is where the geography shifts. Advanced chip exports to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil now need a licence because these countries “present a higher-than-normal risk” of diversion; shipments to companies headquartered in the United States are exempt if they are reported monthly. “Other countries may be added to this list in the future,” and BIS “will be actively monitoring for countries that tolerate evasion”, with possible consequences ranging from import restrictions to Entity List designations, Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg reports.

The targets are not random. Malaysia has the fourth-largest amount of AI compute in the world, according to Epoch AI data cited by CNAS, and counts ByteDance among its data-centre customers. Moonshot AI reportedly trained its Kimi K3 model on Nvidia Blackwell chips accessed remotely from a data centre in Thailand, Bloomberg reported in July, and ByteDance is building a $10bn data centre in Brazil, CNAS notes. “For Malaysia, the controls could be disastrous,” Joshua Kurlantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations told Fortune, as quoted by The Next Web.

The contrast with the Gulf is about enforcement as much as policy. CNAS points out that BIS has one export control officer for all of Southeast Asia; the UAE has one of its own. Singapore offers the sharpest lesson. It signed the San Francisco Declaration on 15 November and was named on the licence list the next day. Membership of Washington’s club does not buy exemption; a record of policing chips seems to count for more.

On paper, that leaves the Gulf well placed to pick up business Southeast Asia may now lose. The Middle East has roughly 1 GW of data-centre capacity, with 2.2 GW under construction and 12 GW in planning, according to JLL data cited by Forbes and EnterpriseAM. US cloud and AI companies, from Microsoft and Amazon to OpenAI, already have licence-free routes into Emirati builds.

The safe-harbour pitch has limits, however. Two Amazon Web Services facilities in the UAE were struck in March during the Iran war, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed a strike on an Amazon data centre in Bahrain, EnterpriseAM reported. Mohammed Soliman of the Middle East Institute expects “more political noise out of Washington that could slow some deliveries or stretch timelines”, he told Fortune. Mr Winter-Levy notes that the dependence “isn’t entirely one-way”, but adds: “the asymmetry is large, since Washington can slow the Gulf’s AI plans with a regulatory notice.”

The price of trust: a Gulf that is splitting

The rule does not stop a Gulf state from hosting Chinese clouds that run on Chinese hardware; Huawei Cloud has operated in Saudi Arabia since September 2023, according to EnterpriseAM. What it ends is the option of serving both worlds on American silicon without Washington’s permission. Any Gulf operator that wants US chips must now be able to show who ultimately owns its largest customers.

The UAE made that choice early: G42 agreed to remove Chinese technology, Huawei equipment included, to secure a $1.5bn Microsoft deal in 2024, EnterpriseAM reported. Qatar has joined it in Pax Silica. Saudi Arabia has kept a foot in both camps: Prosperity7, Aramco’s venture arm, joined a $400m funding round for Zhipu AI, now Z.ai, in 2024, EnterpriseAM reported. June Park of Singapore Management University’s Centre for Digital Law has warned that the kingdom’s US licence “may be ephemeral” (EnterpriseAM).

The space for hedging is shrinking. In AGBI’s reporting, Mr Soliman describes Pax Silica and WAICO as “rival geo-technological architectures” with “vanishingly small” room for overlap, while Ryan Fedasiuk of the American Enterprise Institute says Washington does not want AI partners “free-riding on American innovation while dipping into the coffers of China at the same time”.

Beijing’s response will decide how costly that choice becomes. Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun called the US move “a typical example of economic coercion” and said China would take “necessary measures” to safeguard its interests, Reuters reported.

What to watch

  • The 90-day clock. Data centres already serving Chinese-parented customers above the threshold must hold a licence by mid-February 2027; comments close on 19 January. Applications from Gulf operators, or quiet exits of Chinese clients, will show how much of that business the region carried.
  • 6 April 2027. G42 and Core42’s licence-free access runs out; if they have not become US companies by then, they must apply through BIS’s advisory-opinion process (EnterpriseAM), a test of how durable the UAE’s privileges are.
  • The licence list. BIS says other countries may be added. A Gulf name on it would upend the region’s pitch; a Saudi decision to join Pax Silica would strengthen it.
  • Beijing’s “necessary measures”. China’s suspension of its ban on gallium, germanium and antimony exports to the United States ends on 27 November (The Next Web), an early test of whether Beijing answers with minerals. Watch, too, whether WAICO wins Gulf members beyond Oman.

Bottom line

Washington has turned the geography of computing into a question of verified trust. By naming Southeast Asia and Brazil as diversion risks while preserving the UAE’s special channel, the rule hands the Gulf, and Abu Dhabi above all, a chance to become the compliant offshore home for American chips. The price is the hedge the region has cultivated: on US hardware, Chinese-owned customers now need Washington’s permission, and the trust that makes the Gulf attractive can be narrowed by a single regulatory notice. The UAE and Qatar have made their choice. Saudi Arabia’s is the one to watch.

Sources

  1. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “BIS Issues Rule Addressing Remote Access to American Super Intelligence Technology”, 16 November 2026.
  2. Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg (STR Trade Report), “New Export Restrictions Imposed on AI Chips”, 17 November 2026.
  3. Gibson Dunn, “BIS Expands Advanced Computing Controls to Address Data Center Remote Access and Third Country Diversion”, 18 November 2026.
  4. Nixon Peabody, “BIS targets remote access to advanced chips through overseas data centers”, 17 November 2026.
  5. Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, “Closing the Cloud Loophole: Commerce Issues Interim Final Rule Restricting Remote Access to Advanced Chips”, 17 November 2026.
  6. Center for a New American Security (Michelle Nie Duncan), “Unpacking the Remote Access Rule”, 18 November 2026.
  7. Nextgov/FCW (Grace Dille), “Commerce Department moves to close AI chip loophole”, 16 November 2026.
  8. Reuters (Karen Freifeld), “US to curb China’s access to AI chips as Trump heads to Asia”, 16 November 2026 (via Yahoo Finance).
  9. The Next Web (Alina Maria Stan), “US curbs China’s remote access to AI chips through overseas data centres”, 16 November 2026.
  10. The Next Web (Alina Maria Stan), “China weighs response to US chip curbs before Trump summit”, 17 November 2026.
  11. AFP via Malay Mail, “US confirms criminal probe into Singapore cloud firm Megaspeed over Nvidia AI chips”, 17 November 2026.
  12. Fortune (Melissa Hancock), “Does the Nvidia turmoil spell trouble for the Gulf’s AI ambitions?”, 18 November 2026.
  13. Al-Monitor (Samuel Wendel), “Middle East allies sign US AI pact as Nvidia crisis clouds chip race”, November 2026.
  14. Al-Monitor (Samuel Wendel), “What does Nvidia CEO’s resignation mean for the Middle East’s AI buildout?”, November 2026.
  15. Australian Government, Department of Industry, Science and Resources, “The San Francisco Declaration on the Secure Foundations of Enduring Prosperity, signed by countries attending the Pax Silica Summit, 15 November 2026”, 17 November 2026.
  16. The National (Cody Combs), “UAE among nine US allies pledging to safeguard sensitive AI technology”, 16 November 2026.
  17. EnterpriseAM, “A chip deadline and a war will test how much of its AI buildout the Gulf controls”, 28 October 2026.
  18. EnterpriseAM, “Gulf states join US Pax Silica against China — but Saudi Arabia is holding back”, 29 June 2026.
  19. Arab Gulf Business Insight (AGBI), “Gulf states split between rival US and China AI initiatives”, August 2026.
  20. The New Arab, “What is Pax Silica and why Qatar, UAE joined the US-led alliance”, 23 January 2026.

Photo: Abu Dhabi at night, seen from the International Space Station on 22 May 2025 — NASA Johnson Space Center, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

Artificial intelligence china Export controls Semiconductors UAE

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