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China 20 Nov 2026 · 09:54 · 11 min read by Silk Road

China can live without Iranian oil. Can Iran live without China?

Silk Road study cover: China can live without Iranian oil. Can Iran live without China?
Key takeaways

  • Four months after Washington reimposed its naval blockade, Iranian crude has all but disappeared from China, and China’s independent refiners have replaced it with Iraqi, Qatari, Brazilian and other barrels at a higher cost but without a supply crisis.
  • Gulf producers are the main winners: Iraq’s output has reached a seven-year high and Saudi Aramco has cut its prices for Asia to the lowest since 2020 to win back Chinese demand.
  • Beijing signed an oil-supply pledge with Washington and Moscow in Shenzhen on 19 November without mentioning Iran, which leaves Tehran with no large buyer it can reach and disruption as its main remaining lever.

Why it matters now

This week the oil relationship between China and Iran was tested from both ends. On Tuesday 17 November a US-sanctioned Suezmax called Olym transferred about 200,000 barrels of Iranian oil to the medium-range tanker Hao Fan just south of Iran’s main oil export terminal on Kharg Island, according to United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and Kpler, as reported by Bloomberg. It was the first observed transfer since the United States reinstated its blockade of Iranian ports in mid-July.

The US Navy answered the next day. A maritime advisory issued on 18 November said that ships taking cargo by ship-to-ship transfer from a vessel loaded in Iran “may be considered to be evading the blockade” and “may be stopped, boarded, diverted, captured, or directed to proceed” to the Iranian port where the cargo originated. The same day Iran launched drone and missile attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait, the first in roughly two months.

On 19 November Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met in Shenzhen and declared that their countries plan “to increase the production and supply of refined petroleum products for the benefit of all nations”. The statement did not name the Iran war, and neither Putin nor Xi mentioned it publicly at the summit. Tehran says it will try to break out: an outlet affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards said Iran was considering resuming exports, and on 20 November the ILNA news agency reported the foreign minister as saying that Tehran will make every effort to continue exporting oil and break the blockade.

China has shown that it can live without Iranian oil. The question now is whether Iran can live without China.

Background

For years China was not merely Iran’s biggest oil customer but almost its only one. Roughly 90% of Iran’s oil exports went to China, about 1.4 million barrels a day (bpd) in 2025, according to Arab News; the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission also puts China’s pre-war share at about 90%. Kpler data cited by Reuters show Iranian oil accounted for 13.6% of China’s total oil imports in 2025.

Most of it went to the “teapots”, small independent refiners concentrated in Shandong province that make up close to 30% of China’s refining sector, the world’s biggest. They bought it because it was cheap, at discounts as deep as $10–11 a barrel to Brent earlier this year. Since March 2025 the US Treasury has designated multiple teapot refineries and alerted financial institutions to the sanctions risks of dealing with them.

The war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February changed the scale of the problem. Washington first blockaded Iranian ports in April, a step China’s foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun called “a dangerous and irresponsible move”. That blockade was lifted in June after a memorandum of understanding, then reimposed in mid-July, this time covering Iran’s entire coastline and all its ports and oil terminals.

The flow then drained in stages. By Kpler’s count Iran did not export any crude in September, the first time since the firm began tracking its flows in 2013. China’s imports of Iranian oil, drawn from tankers already at sea, nearly halved from a year earlier to 590,000 bpd that month, while Iranian crude stored on vessels outside the blockade zone more than halved to 45 million barrels from 100 million in late July. In mid-October Admiral Brad Cooper, the commander of US Central Command, said the blockade had stopped Iran from exporting $25bn worth of oil, the Associated Press reported. This week Bloomberg described Iran’s oil exports as halted, forcing production curbs.

The teapots bend but do not break

For China the loss is real but bearable. The replacement barrels cost more: premiums are now $6–20 a barrel for oil from sources including Iraq, Qatar, Angola and Brazil, against the discounts Iran used to offer. Since September the teapots have bought 30–40 million barrels of Iraqi crude alone, plus smaller volumes from Qatar, Brazil, Congo, Angola, Colombia and Canada, for arrival between October and January, Reuters reported on 19 November. As early as October a trader said that “Iraqi oil has become the new benchmark for China’s independent refiners”.

The squeeze shows in run rates. Shandong’s independent refineries were working at 54.7% of capacity in the week to 12 November, according to GL Consulting: above the sub-50% lows of the second quarter, but well below the 65–75% of 2020–21. “Teapots are squeezed on both ends,” said Liao Na, founder and CEO of GL Consulting. “Without discounted oil, teapots are competing against state refiners.” Their margins, she added, are “badly hit as teapots can’t export fuel and domestic fuel prices are capped”.

Yet the system is holding. Sun Jianan of Energy Aspects expects Shandong utilisation to find a floor at around 50% to the end of the year, supported by non-Iranian arrivals and relatively ample import quotas. China imported 9.88 million bpd of crude in October, the most since March, though still 13.3% less than a year earlier; Bloomberg reported that the rebound was led by Iraqi cargoes. There is even an upside for Beijing, which, Reuters notes, has long sought to wring inefficiency out of an overcrowded refining sector. “We’re going to see more divergence among the teapots,” Liao said, adding that those with earlier investments in speciality chemicals will have a better chance to survive in the longer run. To that extent the blockade may be accelerating a consolidation that Chinese planners wanted anyway.

The Gulf fills the gap, at a discount

The replacement barrels came largely from Iran’s neighbours. The International Energy Agency’s Oil Market Report of 13 November found Gulf exports back at 74% of pre-war levels, driven by Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Saudi crude production rose to 10 million bpd in October and Iraq’s reached 4.6 million bpd, a seven-year high, Bloomberg reported. “Despite continued attacks on tankers, Gulf oil exports, excluding Oman, reached 18.4mn b/d last month,” the agency said. Because “Gulf exports recovered much faster than global oil demand”, it expects an overhang of roughly 2 million bpd this quarter and a surplus of 3.8 million bpd in 2027.

Much of that oil is landing in China. Kpler tracked 4.65 million bpd of Middle Eastern crude arriving there in October, the same as in March, Reuters columnist Clyde Russell noted. Saudi arrivals, at 1.6–2 million bpd by Kpler’s and Vortexa’s counts, were back around their 2025 average. Iraq, whose largest customer before the war was China at about 1.2 million bpd, has become the teapots’ main new supplier.

But the Gulf is winning China back on price, in a buyer’s market. In the first nine months of 2026 China bought 809 million barrels of crude from Middle Eastern and North African suppliers, 38.6% less than a year earlier, and Brazil overtook Saudi Arabia as its second-largest supplier after Russia, according to customs data reported by Alhurra. To regain ground, Saudi Aramco cut its December price for Arab Light to Asia by $2 a barrel, to the lowest level since May 2020. Iraq’s Basrah crude, which sold at premiums of about $10–13 over Brent in the past few months, has recently slid to $6 a barrel as freight rates retreated from record highs. “The Chinese market is well supplied and buyers there will always choose the most competitive crudes and adapt,” Yesar Al-Maleki of the Middle East Economic Survey told Arab News.

The result is a quiet transfer of market share inside China from a sanctioned supplier to its Gulf rivals. For Riyadh and Baghdad the prize is volume rather than price; for Beijing it is a choice of suppliers that Tehran can no longer match.

Why Beijing is not riding to Iran’s rescue

In April Beijing protested loudly against the first blockade. In Shenzhen it was silent: neither Iran nor the Strait of Hormuz appeared in the declaration, even though Trump had raised both with Xi, Alhurra reported. Trump said he and Xi agree that Iran needs to fully reopen the strait and cannot obtain a nuclear weapon, but the Associated Press found no sign that he had secured any agreement from Xi or Putin to help solve the Iran conflict. “Both the United States and China have an interest in ensuring that energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz,” Trump said at his meeting with Xi.

That shared interest explains much of China’s restraint. With Gulf exports recovering and the market moving into surplus, Beijing has ample supply without Iranian barrels. Defending Iran’s exports would mean challenging the US Navy at sea and exposing Chinese buyers and banks to further US penalties, for oil it can replace from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Brazil or Russia. “Xi has conflicting interests,” said Ryan Brobst of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Ross Darrell Feingold, a Taipei-based political-risk analyst, was blunter: “China and Russia cannot, and will not, provide any help to Trump to end the conflict with Iran.”

For Iran the arithmetic is harsh. China took about 90% of its exports, and there is no second buyer of that size it can reach by sea while the blockade holds. The new US rules target ship-to-ship transfers, the method that kept Iranian oil moving under earlier sanctions. Charlie Brown, an adviser to UANI, said the Hao Fan‘s cargo was too little to make an export voyage economic, though he expects Iran to try “all kinds of ways to get things out”.

What Iran retains is the power to disrupt. Its strikes on Bahrain and Kuwait on 18 November, and the IEA’s warning that “attacks on shipping undermine maritime security”, are reminders that the Gulf’s recovery depends on Tehran’s restraint as well as on the US Navy.

What to watch

  • A test of the new rules. If Iran resumes loadings, the first cargo intercepted or delivered will show whether the 18 November advisory is enforced at sea, and whether Beijing objects when a China-bound cargo is stopped.
  • Shandong’s floor. Whether teapot utilisation holds around 50% through the year-end, and whether Beijing turns the Shenzhen pledge on refined products into larger fuel exports, which fell to 5.18 million tonnes in October from 7.16 million in September.
  • The price of Gulf barrels. Aramco’s next monthly prices for Asia and Iraq’s Basrah premiums will show whether Gulf producers keep buying market share in China with discounts.
  • Escalation in the Gulf. Further Iranian strikes on Gulf states or shipping would threaten the very supply that has made Iranian oil dispensable to China.

Bottom line

China has absorbed the loss of Iranian oil at a price it can afford: thinner margins in Shandong, a few dollars more a barrel and a faster shake-out of weak refiners. Gulf producers, led by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, have taken the volume, and Beijing’s silence in Shenzhen suggests it will not spend political capital to bring Iran’s barrels back. Iran’s dependence ran deeper. With about 90% of its exports once going to China and no buyer of similar scale within reach, the blockade has turned an asymmetric relationship into a one-sided one. Unless Tehran breaks the blockade or a settlement lifts it, its remaining leverage lies less in selling oil to China than in threatening the oil that others sell.

Sources

  1. Reuters (Chen Aizhu, Siyi Liu), “Without Iranian oil, China’s small refiners face pain but not collapse”, 19 November 2026 (via The China-Global South Project).
  2. Bloomberg (Weilun Soon), “Iranian Oil Transferred Between Tankers as US Widens Blockade”, 20 November 2026 (via Energy Connects).
  3. Shipping Telegraph, “US tightens Iran blockade with curbs on ship-to-ship transfers”, 20 November 2026.
  4. RFE/RL (Matthew Fulco), “Trump, Xi, And Putin Make History, But No Breakthroughs: 4 Takeaways From The Trilateral Summit”, 19 November 2026.
  5. Associated Press (Elaine Kurtenbach, Kanis Leung, Aamer Madhani), “3 takeaways from Trump, Xi and Putin’s historic summit”, 19 November 2026 (via PBS NewsHour).
  6. Alhurra (Alex Willemyns, Vivian Lee), “Trump, Xi, Putin Declaration Skips Iran After First-Ever Trilateral Summit”, 19 November 2026.
  7. Iran International, “Tanker loads Iranian crude in Persian Gulf as Tehran weighs resuming exports”, 19 November 2026.
  8. Newsquawk, “Iran’s Foreign Minister says Tehran will make every effort to continue exporting oil and break the blockade, ILNA reports”, 20 November 2026.
  9. Arab News (Jonathan Gornall), “Analysis: Is China learning to live without Iranian oil?”, 8 October 2026.
  10. Reuters (Siyi Liu, Chen Aizhu), “Chinese independent refiners boost Iraqi oil purchases as Iranian flows fall”, 6 October 2026 (via Hydrocarbon Processing).
  11. Associated Press, “CENTCOM chief: US has blocked Iran from exporting $25b worth of oil”, 16 October 2026 (via The Times of Israel).
  12. Fox News (Greg Norman), “China slams US military blockade of Strait of Hormuz as a ‘dangerous and irresponsible move'”, 14 April 2026.
  13. Reuters (Sam Li, Lewis Jackson), “China’s October crude oil imports rise to highest level since March”, 10 November 2026 (via Yahoo Finance).
  14. Reuters (Clyde Russell), “China’s crude oil imports recover, fuel exports not so much”, 10 November 2026 (via BOE Report).
  15. Bloomberg, “China Oil Imports Rebound as More Crude Flows From Gulf”, 10 November 2026 (via Energy Connects).
  16. Bloomberg (Grant Smith), “IEA Sees Oil Surplus for First Time in Iran War”, 13 November 2026 (via Rigzone).
  17. Argus, “Global oil supply to surpass demand in 4Q: IEA”, 13 November 2026.
  18. Reuters (Florence Tan, Siyi Liu), “Saudi Arabia cuts December Asia oil prices to fresh 6-year low”, 5 November 2026 (via BOE Report).
  19. Alhurra (Zhou Yu), “China Buys Far Less Middle Eastern Oil, as Exports Hold Steady”, 22 October 2026.

china Energy security Iran Iraq Saudi Arabia

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